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AFRICA AND INTERNATIONAL
CORRUPTION: THE STRANGE CASE OF
SOUTH AFRICA AND SEYCHELLES
STEPHEN ELLIS
THE SUBJECT OF CORRUPTION has emerged at the top of the agenda in
recent dealings between African governments and the Western donors on
whom many are heavily dependant. It is notoriously difficult to define
corruption,1 but it is generally understood to entail the use of an official
position for purposes of private enrichment or illegitimate advantage.
During the 1970s and 1980s, there was a stream of books on corruption
in Africa2 or on closely related concepts such as neo-patrimonialism,3
prebendalism4 and kleptocracy.5 Particularly since a World Bank report
in 1989 explicitly spoke of a 'crisis of governance' in Africa south of the
Sahara,6 much of the discussion of corruption south of the Sahara has
been subsumed in a wider debate on governance.
The literature on corruption or on governance in Africa more generally
tends to adopt a national perspective, investigating how national elites use
corruption or manipulation of public policy to enrich themselves and
maintain themselves in power.7 It is rather less frequent, at least in the
academic literature, to encounter detailed studies of the relationship
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between corruption in various parts of Africa and that in industrialized
countries.8
The present article is an attempt to trace the development of corruption
in one part of Africa in a global context. It demonstrates how the ease
with which capital can be transferred and commodities bought and sold
and the speed of modern communication in general have been given
considerable impetus to the Unking of corrupt practices across borders, and
that this process of trans-national corruption was considerably encouraged
by the Cold War. The main focus of study is Seychelles, a small country
but one which has the merit—if that is the right word—of providing
interesting data on the subject under discussion. After independence
in 1976 Seychelles was subject to intense international diplomatic and
military activity, often of a covert nature, due largely to the islands'
strategic location, which made them an asset both in US-Soviet rivalry in
the Indian Ocean and in the more localized patterns of conflict stemming
from South Africa's drive to assert its hegemony in southern Africa, notably
by destabilizing or manipulating neighbouring states. This led to attempts
to subvert or influence the islands' government by bribery and by force,
while more powerful governments and business interests associated with
political parties as far afield as Italy manipulated Seychelles' status as a
sovereign state in order to perform various transactions of dubious
legality. There is some evidence also that the islands were used for
financial transactions by arms-dealers and as a staging-post for drug-
trafficking. These various interests became intertwined with each other
and with the Seychelles' government's own policies, having a demonstrable
effect on governance in the islands.
It should be emphasized at the outset that not all the transactions,
individuals or circumstances described here can be described as
corrupt. On the contrary, one of the principal conclusions which can be
drawn from the present essay is that grand corruption, sometimes masquer-
ading as ration d'etat, shapes the environment in which individual
politicians, diplomats and business people are obliged to operate.
Seychelles
The Republic of Seychelles consists of over a hundred islands scattered
over a wide area of the western Indian Ocean. Most of its population—a
mere 60,000 people at independence in 1976, and less than 100,000
8. A non-governmental organization established in Germany in 1993, Transparency Inter-
national, studies international aspects of corruption in the third world. German Foundation
for International Development, Accountability and Transparency in International Economic
Development: the launching of transparency international (Zentralstelle fur Wirtschafts- und
Soaalentwicklung, Berlin, 1993). There is an abundant literature on illicit international
business practices, money-laundering etc., in which Africa receives little attention since, in
world terms, the African role in international business is small. See for example, Ingo
Walter, Secret Money (Unwin, London, 2nd edn., 1989).
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today—is concentrated on just two islands. For a century and a half
Seychelles was a remote and insignificant part of the British Empire. Only
in 1971, as Britain renounced its colonial presence in the Indian Ocean, did
the British government endow the islands with an international airport
which was to transform their economic and strategic position by providing
easy physical access to the rest of the world.
Britain's strategy for decolonization in the western Indian Ocean from
the 1960s entailed divesting itself of colonies while detaching from the
colonial administrative territories strategically useful islands which could
become the sites for air and naval bases politically easier to manage than
bases in more populous territories.9 As Seychelles became independent,
Britain at first attempted to retain its influence by supplying the country's
first president, Sir James Mancham, with covert political finance and
security assistance.10 But Britain's political role in the region rapidly
declined as Britain lost its ability to project its power world-wide. As the
Indian Ocean emerged as a major site of Cold War strategic interest,11 it
was the United States which tended to take over former British assets in the
area. The US government built its principal air and naval base in the
Indian Ocean a thousand miles to the east of Seychelles, on the island of
Diego Garcia, a former dependency of Mauritius whose entire population
the British government deported before leasing the island to the US.12 As
part of its global military communications network the US government also
built in the Seychelles an important satellite tracking station.
President Mancham was staunchly pro-Western in his foreign policy and
seems to have envisaged attracting Middle Eastern petro-dollars for the
economic development of his country, most notably through his highly
public friendship with the Saudi businessman and arms dealer Adnan
Kashoggi.13 But within one year of his election, on the night of 4-5 June
1977, President Mancham was overthrown in a coup by his prime minister,
France Albert Rene. Rene's coup was aided by the government of
Tanzania, and the new president soon took Seychelles into the left-wing
camp in African politics. It became a one-party state. Nevertheless
Rend continued his predecessor's policy of encouraging the creation of a
tourist industry in the islands, and this has helped to make the country
9. Jean Houbcrt, 'The Indian Ocean Creole Islands: Geo-Politics and Decolonization',
Journal of Modern African Studies, 30, 3 (1992), pp. 465-84.
10. Jonathan Bloch & Patrick Fitzgerald, British Intelligence and Coven Action (Brandon,
Dingle, Co. Kerry, 1983), pp. 196-9. Cf. Mancham's own account in James Mancham,
Paradise Raped (Methuen, London, 1983).
11. Philippe Leymarie, L'ocean Indxem It noveau coeur du monde (Karthala, Paris, 1981).
12. Andre Oraison,'Les avatars du BIOT (British Indian Ocean Territory). Le processus
de l'implantation militaire americaine a Diego Garcia', Annuaire des pays de l'ocean Indien,
vol. VI (Editions du CNRS, Paris, and Presses universitaires d'Aix-Marseilles, Aix-en-
Provence, 1979), pp. 177-209.
13. Christopher Lee, Seychelles: Political castaways (Elm Tree Books, London, 1976),
pp. 1-3.
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today an economic success by African standards. President Rene, realis-
ing that Western holiday-makers were Seychelles' most obvious customers
and source of foreign exchange, strove to maintain correct relations with
Western governments as well as with the socialist countries where his
personal political sympathies lay.
Much of the world's oil cargoes pass through the Indian Ocean, and in a
period of turbulence in the Middle East and of Soviet ambitions to create
a naval presence in the Indian Ocean, and especially after the 1979
revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the whole of
the western Indian ocean rapidly increased in strategic importance.14
Seychelles was sufficiently important in Cold War strategic planning for
the US government to be concerned by the pro-Soviet sympathies of
the islands' government after the 1977 coup. France too had strategic
ambitions in the Indian Ocean which caused it to take an interest in the
islands; the government of Seychelles seems to have suspected the French
government of being connected with a coup plot uncovered in the islands
in 1979, expelling French military advisors and replacing them with
Tanzanians and Algerians.15 The Soviet Union maintained a large
embassy staff in Seychelles and for several years the Soviet ambassador was
Mikhail Orlov, regarded by Western intelligence agencies as a senior KGB
officer, said to have previously worked as the chief of the important KGB
station in Turkey. Soviet warships paid courtesy calls to the islands and
the Soviet Union also proffered other forms of assistance. Moreover by
the early 1980s there were more than 100 North Korean military advisors
in the islands.16 Another country interested in Seychelles was South
Africa, whose government was concerned to prevent the Soviet Union from
extending its influence in southern Africa, and which saw the Republic of
Seychelles as a potential asset in South Africa's own ambition of securing
regional hegemony.
Within a short time of its independence in 1976, then, Seychelles had
become of considerable strategic interest to the two super-powers and to a
number of lesser powers—France, South Africa and others—all of which
sought to exercise influence in the islands. The country was exceptionally
vulnerable to the pressures which larger governments could exert, largely
because of its small size and tiny army, and perhaps also because its tourist
industry was reliant on Seychelles' being able to maintain an image of
tranquillity and unspoiled beauty in order to attract holiday-makers. One
might add that the manner in which President Rene took power in 1977
14. Among several books on security in the Indian Ocean produced in the 1970s, see e.g.
W. A. C. Adie, OH, Politics and Seapotoer: the Indian Ocean vortex (Crane, Russak, New York,
1975). On the later period, Leymarie, L'odan Indien.
15. Philip M. Allen, Security and Nationalism in the Indian Ocean (Westview Press, Boulder
and London, 1987), p. 123.
16. 'An Indian Ocean Face-OfF, Newsweek, 17 September 1984.
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was a significant cause of instability, for, like most other coups, it had
established a precedent for the transfer of power by unconstitutional means
which was to put into question the government's legitimacy in years to
come.
Beset by the attention of foreign secret services and by plots from within,
President Rene turned for help to a friend, Giovanni Mario Ricci, an Italian
businessman who had been living in Seychelles since shortly before
independence. Due to the influence he had with Rene, Ricci was to
become an important intermediary for foreigners wishing to cultivate
commercial or political relations in Seychelles, as we will shortly describe in
more detail. Mario Ricci was born near Lucca, Italy, in 1929.
Convicted of fraud in Italy in 1958, he had gone to seek his fortune
abroad. He was convicted a second time, in Switzerland, this time for
possessing counterfeit currency.17 Ricci lived in Mexico and Haiti before
making his way to Somalia where he set up a business exporting
grapefruit. He was expelled from Somalia for reasons unknown around
1974, moving to settle in Seychelles.18 He was a distinctive figure in the
islands, instantly recognizable by his long beard, grown white since he first
went to live in Seychelles.
Ricci became President Rene's friend and unofficial financial advisor.
In 1978 he set up a company, the Seychelles Trust Company, in a joint
venture with the Seychelles government. The government granted to the
Seychelles Trust Company sole rights to incorporate off-shore companies
and to act as resident agent for foreign companies and foundations
registered in Seychelles, which could operate free of tax. The granting of
this right to a private company was unique in that it made the Seychelles
Trust Company the only private offshore business registration company in
the world, and, in effect, Seychelles became the world's first socialist tax
haven.19 In 1981 the government sold its shares in the Seychelles Trust
Company, leaving Ricci in sole control. The cost of registering a foreign
company, payable to the government, was a mere 1,500 rupees, or 8300.
It was to Ricci that President Rene turned for help after an attempted
coup in 1981 (which is discussed in more detail below) had convinced him
of the need to improve his government's security. At the President's
request, Ricci hired private detectives to keep the exiled opposition under
surveillance.20 In 1982 a private detective employed by Ricci succeeded
in planting a recording device in a London hotel room being used by
17. Affidavit dated 11 October 1986 submitted by G. Mario Ricci to the High Court of
Justice of England and Wales, Queen's Bench Division, case of Giovanni Mario Ricci versus
Paul Chow, 1986 R-No. 183: copy in the possession of the author. Also, Francois d'Aubert,
L'argent sale: enquete sw un krach ntentissant (Plon, Paris, 1993), pp. 155-65.
18. Gianfranco Turano, 'Promette il Paradiso', IIMondo, 30 March-8 April 1991, pp. 75-9.
19. See Ricci's introduction to Claude Pavard, Seychelles, from one island to another (Editions
Dellroisse, no place or date). Also Indian Ocean Newsletter, 7 March 1992.
20. Interview with Mario Ricci in L'Esprtsso, 27 January 1985.
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Seychellois exiles to plot a coup against the government, and the tape was
handed to the British press.21 Both the single party and the government of
Seychelles came to rely on Ricci for various financial services, and accepted
cash from him, in President Rene's words 'when [the government] needed
to finance something for which we didn't immediately have the money'.22
Ricci in turn received privileged treatment from the government, and when
one of his companies was nationalized, he was paid in cash, whereas other
companies in a similar position received only government bonds.23
President Rene later stated that he had taken the precaution of asking the
Italian authorities whether Ricci had a criminal record, but 'they told us
that they had nothing on him.'24
Ricci was associated with some distinctly unusual companies in addition
to the Seychelles Trust Company. In 1982 he was listed as a director of
an entity immodestly entitled International Monetary Funding, or IMF, for
short, not be confused with the International Monetary Fund.25 In 1984
he was accredited to Seychelles as a diplomat representing the Sovereign
Order of the Coptic Catholic Knights of Malta which, it emerged, was a
commercial company incorporated in New York.26 Seychelles was the
only state in the world to recognize the order.27 President Rene later
claimed diat his government had granted Ricci diplomatic status in the
mistaken belief that Ricci's Knights of Malta was in fact the Sovereign
Order of Saint John, Knights of Malta, die well-known Vatican order of
chivalry. Through his accreditation Ricci gained the right to use a
diplomatic pouch and a diplomatic passport, and eventually he was to
become the doyen of the diplomatic corps in the islands. President Rene
also confided diplomatic missions to him, such as the improvement of
relations with Somalia, where Ricci had once lived and where he still had
useful contacts.28
Ricci increasingly used one of his many companies, GMR (named after
his own initials), as a flagship for various interests. According to GMR's
own company brochure it was 'a conglomerate of companies which
operates throughout the world' and was 'managed from the operational
headquarters in the Republic of Seychelles'.29 At various times GMR's
21. Barrie Penrose and Simon Freeman, 'The Plotters in Room 412', Sunday Times
(London), 24 October 1982.
22. Interview with President Rcn6 in The Indian Ocean Newsletter, 6 and 13 September 1986.
23. Seychelles Freedom Herald No. 7, September 1985, p. 3.
24. Interview with President Rene in The Indian Ocean Newsletter, 6 and 13 September 1986.
25. Michael Gillard, 'Banking Ripples from Seychelles', The Observer, 18 July 1982.
26. Martin Bailey, 'Unchivalrous World of the Bogus Knights', The Observer, 15 March
1987.
27. Indian Ocean Newsletter, 19 July 1992.
28. Giuseppe Meroni, 'La Victoria degli Italian!', Capital, August 1986, pp. 72-5.
29. 'GMR Group in South Africa', company brochure, no date. Also,'G.M.R. Group alle
Seychelles: Programma di Vendita di Azioni e di Obbligazioni Convertibili,' company
brochure, May 1981.
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management, consisting mostly of Ricci and members of his and his wife's
families, claimed to control companies in as many as 24 countries,
including several in southern and eastern Africa as well as in more
conventional business locations such as Britain and Switzerland, and tax
havens including Panama, Liechtenstein and Luxembourg. This and
Ricci's other companies in the islands were registered and run in conform-
ity with Seychelles law. Already by the early 1980s, Ricci had acquired a
reputation as someone who could be approached by anyone who wished to
transact some form of business in Seychelles. Although having no official
government position, he was diplomat, unofficial head of security,
businessman and financial advisor to President Rene all rolled into one.
South Africa
Among the countries which had developed an interest in Seychelles was
South Africa. At the time of the islands' independence in 1976, South
Africa's National Party government was already feeling the impact of
diplomatic isolation and of the gradual development of a military threat to
its security. The government in Pretoria placed increasing importance on
securing influence and the capacity to exercise force both within and
outside its borders by clandestine means, notably through the development
of its secret services (especially the Bureau of State Security, established in
1969) and the Department of Information. For as long as Namibia
remained a South African colony, and Rhodesia, Mozambique and Angola
remained under colonial or settler rule, South Africa itself was insulated
from external aggression, but the situation changed rapidly with the
independence of Angola and Mozambique in 1975 and the Soweto
uprising of 1976.
The Department of Information was an agency of the South African
government whose tasks included the covert distribution of government
monies—in other words, bribery—to buy influence at home and abroad.
This included in Seychelles. During Sir James Mancham's brief tenure of
the presidency Seychelles was regularly visited by South African secret
servants carrying '[bags full] of,bribe money to secure South African
interests', the editor of the Johannesburg Sunday Express later
recalled.30 In 1978 the Department of Information's role was exposed in
a political scandal known as 'Muldergate' or 'Infogate', in which it was
revealed that the Department had not only bribed journalists and secretly
bought newspapers at home and abroad in a bid to secure better public
relations, but that senior civil servants and politicians in South Africa had
abused the Department's lack of parliamentary accountability for purposes
30. Obituary notice: 'Eschel Rhoodie', by Rex Gibson, The Independent, 28 July 1993. See
also Mancham, Paradise Raped.
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of personal enrichment—in other words, corruption.31 The Muldergate
scandal became closely associated with the struggle to succeed the ailing
Prime Minister, John Vorster, and to supplant the influence wielded by the
Bureau of State Security (BOSS), which was headed by a political
appointee, the prime minister's friend and confidant General H. J. van
den Bergh. The favourite to succeed Vorster, Dr Connie Mulder, was
disgraced as a result of the scandal and lost his claim to the premiership.
The person who emerged victorious from the political in-fighting
surrounding the Muldergate scandal to become prime minister of South
Africa in 1978 was the Defence Minister, P. W. Botha, who had powerful
support from the generals of the South African Defence Force (SADF).
The military men resented van den Bergh's and BOSS's pre-eminence
in security manners and believed that the changed situation in southern
Africa necessitated a complete overhaul of security policy under military
direction. The security chiefs, the 'securocrats' as they came to be known,
were to acquire great power under P. W. Botha's premiership and later
presidency. They unveiled a comprehensive new strategy whose centre-
piece was the defence of the South African state in the face of what the
government saw as a comprehensive threat, a 'total onslaught' in Prime
Minister Botha's words, orchestrated by the Soviet Union.32 Seychelles
had a minor but distinct role in this strategy. The islands offered not only
potential military facilities but also possible use as a base for clandestine
trading purposes in the face of economic sanctions, especially after the
Iranian revolution of 1979 had threatened South Africa's main supply of
oil. South Africa in fact was to acquire most of its oil after 1979 from
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.33
Due to a combination of the new defence strategy in Pretoria and the
change in government in Seychelles in 1977, the South African secret
services decided that bribery was no longer the most effective means of
acquiring influence in the islands. In 1978 Seychellois exiles in South
Africa, acting on behalf of ex-President Mancham, began discussions with
officials concerning a coup attempt to be launched in Seychelles. The
BOSS case officer who became most closely concerned with this scheme
was one Martin Dolinchek.34 As plans for the Seychelles' coup developed
the SADF lobbied to acquire control of the project, and the operation
became the subject of an intense bureaucratic struggle between the military
and the civilian intelligence service, The National Intelligence Service
31. Mervyn Rees and Chris Day, Muldergau (Macmillan South Africa, Johannesburg,
1980).
32. Joseph Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbours: apartheid power in Southern Africa (James
Currey, London, 1986), pp. 7-16.
33. Shipping Research Bureau (R. Hengeveld & J. Rodenburg, eds.), Embargo: apartheid's oil
secrets revealed (Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam, 1995).
34. Mike Hoare, The Seychelles Affair (Corgi edition, London, 1987), pp. 1-108.
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(NIS). The NIS was the direct descendant of the former BOSS, which
had been disgraced in the Muldergate scandal and subsequently over-
hauled and twice renamed. Prime Minister Botha was more sympathetic
to the military men than he was to the civilian intelligence service. In the
end the government allocated planning for the Seychelles' coup operation
to Military Intelligence, while the protests of the civilian intelligence service
were mollified by the appointment of Martin Dolinchek as a liaison officer
on behalf of the NIS.35 In order to provide a screen of deniability to the
Seychelles' coup attempt the operation was entrusted to Mike Hoare, an
Irish mercenary soldier who had made his name in the Congo but was now
living in South Africa as a civilian. Hoare was later to testify that the coup
plans were approved by the South African Cabinet and that weapons were
provided by South African Military Intelligence.36 Most of the 45 or so
people selected to carry out the coup were members of South African
special forces, several of them former Rhodesian soldiers, some with earlier
experience in the British army.37
On 25 November 1981 Hoare and his men landed at Seychelles
international airport disguised as tourists, members of a drinking-club
called the Ancient Order of Frothblowers. After a customs officer had
found weapons in the luggage of one of the purported tourists, the invaders
fought a brief gun-battle at the airport and escaped aboard an Air India
jet which happened to be on the tarmac and which they hijacked. They
left behind five soldiers, a female accomplice and also Dolinchek, the
intelligence man.38 The Seychelles' government arrested and tried the six
men, acquiring from them full information on the planning of the coup.
Four of the six were sentenced to death. Hoare and some others were
tried on their return to South Africa.
The Pretoria government, severely embarrassed, opened negotiations for
the return of the six convicted mercenaries, and they were eventually
returned to South Africa in mid-1983. The conditions for their release
were not publicized, and only gradually did it become apparent that in the
course of negotiations the South African government had not only paid to
President Rene a ransom of S3 million,39 but that this was part of a broader
understanding with President Rene personally. His cabinet was not
informed of the progress of the talks nor of the ransom payment.40
President Rene, alarmed by the succession of coup attempts against him,
35. Joseph Lelyvcld, "New Role for Pretoria Army Intelligence Unit?', International Herald
Tribune, 11 May 1982.
36. Hoare, The Seychelles Affair, p. 77.
37. White Paper on Aggression of November 25th 1981 against the Republic of Seychelles
(Department of Information, Victoria, Seychelles, 1982).
38. Two memoirs of the incident are Hoare, The Seychelles Affair, and Jerry Puren (with
Brian Pottinger), Mercenary Commander (Galago, Alberton, South Africa, 1986).
39. The Independent, 29 July 1992.
40. Author's interview with former Foreign Minister Maxime Ferrari, Paris, 22 April 1993.
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asked Mario Ricci to help improve his security service. He realized that in
order to survive he needed to adjust his foreign policy to accommodate
South African interests, at least in some measure. The government also
took a series of steps designed to mend fences with both South Africa and
the US, whose own Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had had foreknowl-
edge of the coup attempt,41 and there was a notable shift in Seychelles'
voting record in the United Nations and other international fora.42 The
advent of a Socialist government in France in 1981 also helped to ease the
pressure on the islands' government, since France maintained an interest
in the region notably through its possession of the island of Reunion and
military base in Djibouti. For its part, in 1983 the South African
government uncovered a further coup plan which was under discussion and
expelled from its territory Seychellois opposition activists including Gerard
Hoarau, a former seminary student who had been detained in Seychelles in
connection with the 1979 coup plot and had gone into exile.43 Hoarau
was a cousin of Rene's wife and, speaking fluent Italian, had previously
been a friend of Ricci.
It appears to have been in the aftermath of the 1981 coup attempt,
during negotiations for the release of the six South African mercenaries,
that the South African secret services first came fully to appreciate Ricci's
significance as a potential intermediary with President Rene. At that time
the number two person in section A, the foreign desk of the South African
Security Police, was Craig Williamson, the country's best-known spy.
Recruited by the Security Police while he was still at university in South
Africa, Williamson had posed as a left-wing student activist and gone
into exile, where he succeeded in infiltrating the ANC. In 1979 his true
allegiance was revealed and he returned to Pretoria to take up a post at
Security Police headquarters. To compound the damage inflicted on the
ANC, he absconded from the organization with substantial funds in his
possession. These he had turned over to the Security Police, and the
ANC's money was later used to buy a farm near Pretoria which was to
become a base for operations by Security Police death-squads.44 In 1985
Williamson resigned from the Security Police and publicly announced
that he was going into business. It was not announced that he had at the
same time been commissioned as a colonel in South African Military
Intelligence. Williamson later explained his resignation from the Security
41. Lelyveld, "New Role for Pretoria Army Intelligence Unit?'.
42. Arthur Gavshon, 'Seychelles Policies are Shifting to the West*, The Star, 3 October
1983. This was confirmed by the author's own interviews with Seychellois officials.
43. 'Crackdown Seen as Part of Pik's New Diplomatic Drive', Star, 25 January 1984.
Tony Stirling, 'Foiled Plot as "Double Agent"—Claim', The Citizen, 9 December 1983.
44. Jacques Pauw, In the Heart of the Whore (Southern Book Publishers, Halfway House,
South Africa, 1991), pp. 59-60.
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Police on the grounds that 'I decided to get involved in proper intelligence
work, especially on the international scene'.45
By the mid-1980s Williamson and Ricci had developed a close
relationship. In 1986, the year after Williamson's resignation from the
police, Ricci's GMR company was registered to do business in South Africa
and Williamson was appointed managing director of GMR South Africa
and vice-president of GMR world-wide. In GMR's own company litera-
ture, the GMR conglomerate was henceforth said to be 'controlled from
the executive offices based in Switzerland and South Africa.' The company
prospectus represented GMR as a holding company which owned various
companies world-wide. Some GMR subsidiary companies, it said, were
local acquisitions made in the hope of being able to resell them again at a
profit. Other subsidiaries it described as 'parked', dormant companies
which could be activated to deal with specific transactions if necessary.46
Williamson assisted Ricci in acquiring permanent resident's status in South
Africa.47 He scoffed at pointed questions from journalists about Ricci's
mysterious background, suggesting that any debatable points in Ricci's
curriculum vitae could be explained quite easily. 'There is no hot money,
or mafia money, in the GMR operation,' Williamson declared to the
press.48 There is no evidence that Ricci was aware of Williamson's
commission in Military Intelligence, but he must certainly have known of
his earlier career in the Security Police.
The opening of GMR in South Africa, and the appointment of Craig
Williamson as its managing director, gave Ricci access to business oppor-
tunities in South Africa, and by the same token it gave Williamson access to
the GMR empire and to Ricci's business connections. Williamson hinted
to journalists that his purpose was to use Seychelles and the GMR
company to avoid the trade sanctions which were being applied with
increasing severity to South Africa. 'I would like to assist South Africa in
the economic warfare facing it', Williamson was quoted as saying, when
asked about his new career as the chief executive of Ricci's GMR
company. Williamson described GMR as 'flexible' and talked about how
it could be used as a front by other companies seeking to do business with
South Africa. 'If [GMR] is faced with anti-sanctions laws,' he said, 'it will
restructure its activities to avoid any inhibiting laws.'49 On another
occasion Williamson divulged: 'we are involved in trade in strategic
commodities. I don't want to go into details, but GMR has a background
45. Phillip van Niekerk, 'How We Bombed London', The Observer, 19 February 1995.
46. 'GMR Group in South Africa,' company brochure, no date.
47. Kin Katzin, 'Ricci Expose: the Inside Story1, Sunday Star, 7 February 1988.
48. Kitt Katzin, 'Nat Superspy's Shadowy Boss,' Sunday Star, 19 April 1987.
49. Sarah Sussens, 'Superspy Williamson Turns to Sanctions.' Sunday Tribune, 30 November
1986.
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in oil.'50 In effect, although Ricci himself had virtually no experience in
the oil business, he had earlier helped to introduce to Seychelles some
Italians with extensive expertise in the oil business, to whom Williamson
may have been referring. This will be discussed further below.
Williamson, cultivating his new persona as a trader, gave seminars to
South African businessmen looking for new markets in the Far East and
lectured on how to evade sanctions.51 He seemed intent on creating
a political niche for himself as well, and his political ambitions clearly
had support from the very top of the ruling parry. In 1987 he stood
for parliament as a candidate for the National Party in a suburb of
Johannesburg but failed to secure election. Not to be thwarted, President
Botha appointed Williamson a member of the President's Council.
By this time, South Africa's relationship with Seychelles was thoroughly
ambiguous. Seychelles was often represented in the South African press,
and the Western press generally, as pro-Soviet and anti-apartheid. In
reality, Pretoria had developed closer relations with the government in
Victoria in the months after the 1981 mercenary coup attempt and had
expelled Seychellois opposition leaders from South Africa, but the South
African secret services at the same time conspired with a group of
coup-plotters based in Britain through a diplomat at the South African
Embassy in London.52 The South African secret services eventually
betrayed the coup plot to the Seychelles government in August 1986 and
in effect aborted the plan. It seems that the South African strategy was
to cultivate all sides in Seychelles with a view to cementing its own
influence. After the August 1986 coup plot, South Africa's Military
Intelligence had the Seychelles government under effective control, largely
through Williamson and the relationship he had established with Ricci.
GMR South Africa shared its Johannesburg office with another company
controlled by Williamson, named Longreach, which acquired responsibility
for government security in Seychelles after 1986. Years later, after the
African National Congress had come to power, Williamson was to admit
that Longreach was in fact secretly owned by Military Intelligence.53
Seychelles was all the more useful as a Military Intelligence asset because of
its government's pro-Soviet reputation. In matters of strategic deception,
the South African secret services had made considerable advances since the
ham-fisted bribery of the Department of Information and the 1981
mercenary fiasco.
50. The Observer, 26 April 1987.
51. Byline Africa News Feature Service, 11/SO4/87.
52. Richard Dowden and Stephen Ellis, 'The Anatomy of a Conspiracy1, The Independent,
23 October 1987.
53. Phillip van Niekerk, 'How Apartheid Conned the West1, The Observer, 16 July 1995.
See also Longreach registration records: Company file 86 02070/07, Registrar of Companies,
Pretoria.
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Although Longreach purported to deal mainly in risk analysis, claiming
officially to be advising businessmen on conditions for investment in
southern Africa, particularly in Mozambique, Uganda and Burundi,54 it in
fact operated as an agent of Military Intelligence both inside and outside
South Africa. Williamson once admitted that the company had engaged a
French mercenary to carry out die attempted murder of President Lennox
Sebe of Ciskei.55 This, it transpired, was part of an operation by South
African Military Intelligence aimed at incorporating Ciskei into a larger
new homeland.56
South Africa's transition to democracy after 1990 did not mean the end
of the covert networks established in earlier years, including those in
Seychelles. Senior South African ministers continued to visit Seychelles:
in April 1991 Defence Minister Magnus Malan visited the islands, follow-
ing Foreign Minister Pik Botha who had also been on a visit earlier in the
year.57 In 1994, the press reported that a South African naval officer,
Commodore Willem 'Ters' Ehlers, who had succeeded Williamson as chief
executive of GMR in South Africa, had negotiated with the Zairean
government the purchase of some 840 million of arms. These weapons
were almost certainly intended for eventual transfer to Rwanda. Ehlers
had worked as a private secretary to President P. W. Botha and it was in
this capacity that he had first met Mario Ricci.58 After Botha's retirement,
Ehlers had gone to work for GMR, apparendy from 1990 until around
1992. A spokesman for GMR said in 1994 that both Williamson and
Ehlers had ceased to work for the company.59 Williamson had indeed
resigned on 31 December 1988 and Ricci in November 1991.60 A lead-
ing US human rights organization, Human Rights Watch, repeated the
allegations the following year.61
This was one of several cases in the 1990s indicating the extent to which
the South African state arms company ARMSCOR remained a major inter-
national arms dealer even after the end of the armed struggle for control of
South Africa, both selling arms manufactured in South Africa and brokering
54. Author's interview with Major Michael Irwin, Longreach Managing Director, London,
24 July 1987.
55. Kitt Katzin, 'Superspy and the Jackal', Sunday Star, 28 February 1988; idem,
•Williamson Admits Tie to Mystery Mercenary,' Sunday Star, 6 March 1988.
56. Louise Flanagan, 'PW Knew of SADF Plan to Topple Sebe', Weekly Mail, 26 March to
1 April 1993. On the background, Jeff Peires, "The Implosion of Transkei and Ciskei',
African Affairs, 364, 91 (1992), pp. 365-87.
57. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 3 April 1991.
58. Sam Sole, 'Former PW Man in Rwanda Arms Link", Sunday Tribune, 3 July 1994.
59. Indian Ocean Newsletter, 16 July 1994.
60. File number 86/02890/07, GMR Group South Africa (pty) Ltd., Registrar of
Companies, Pretoria.
61. Human Rights Watch Arms Project, Rwanda/Zaire: Rearming with impunity (Vol. 7,
no. 4, Washington and New York, May 1995). Stefaans Brimmer, 'SA's Arms-Dealing
Underworld', Weekly MaH & Guardian, 2-8 June 1995.
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third-party deals.62 In Africa today arms-dealing is a lucrative business, and
also one with obvious political implications. Even since the demise of the
National Party government in 1994 ARMSCOR continues to be something
of a law unto itself, still largely staffed by the personnel of the apartheid era
carrying out secretive weapons deals, some of which have embarrassed the
ANC government, and making use of commercial networks created in earlier
years in both public and private sectors. As with all modern weapons-deals,
ARMSCOR's commercial sales have political implications. This is true of
every country with a weapons-exporting industry. In the case of South
Africa, however, the question is to know to what extent arms sales are under
effective government control.
Covert operations and corruption
GMR and Longreach were only two of the hundreds of companies set up
or acquired by the South African security establishment in pursuit of the
strategy of counter-revolution. Some of these companies were used to
trade in products subject to international sanctions, including oil, but also
in less legitimate products such as ivory and rhino horn.63 One of
Longreach's original board of directors, James Anthony White, a former
member of the Rhodesian Selous Scouts, was reported to have an interest
in the ivory trade.64 Front companies were used to channel weapons or
supplies to South African allies in Angola, Mozambique and elsewhere.
Some, like the network run by the main SADF death-squad, the Civil
Co-operation Bureau, were used to carry out assassinations, and others for
money-laundering or for peddling political influence. Another Military
Intelligence front with which Williamson was associated, the International
Freedom Foundation, succeeded in enlisting senior members of the
Republican Party in the US, including Senator Jesse Helms, later to
become chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, in the
campaign to defend apartheid.65
The securing of influence in Seychelles was very useful for various
activities of this type. Thus, Chieftain Airlines, a front company used by
the South African secret services which was later investigated for corrup-
tion, applied to the South African National Transportation Commission to
fly Boeing 737s between Johannesburg, the Comoros and Seychelles.66
62. A subject recently investigated by a judicial commission of inquiry in South Africa, the
Cameron Commission.
63. Stephen Ellis, 'Of Elephants and Men: Politics and nature conservation in South Africa',
Journal of Southern African Studies, 20, 1 (1994), pp. 53-70.
64. Environmental Investigation Agency, Under Fire: elephants in the front line (London,
1992), p. 35.
65. Van Niekerk, 'How Apartheid Conned the West*.
66. Kitt Katzin, The R 100-m Puzzle: Who is Backing Chieftain Airlines?, Sunday Star,
undated clipping. On Chieftain Airlines, see Kommissie van Ondenoek na Sekere Moonthke
Oreilmaaghede, Hoofvenlag, Sy Edele Regter L.T.C. Harms (Staatsdrukker, Pretoria,
1989). Henceforth called the Harms Commission.
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The Comoros too were used by South Africa for clandestine arms
shipments to the Middle East, and from 1979 South Africa paid the French
mercenaries who were to run the islands' Presidential Guard until 1990.67
Pretoria's 'total strategy' required massive resources to implement and
it required the people who managed it, the securocrats, to become
interested in spheres of activity which are traditionally outside the scope
of the military. Some of this was done openly; some of it required
deception, either in the form of secret operations, or the establishment
of secret organs of government, or the use of covert activity, meaning
actions whose real purpose is other than the apparent one. The total
strategy implied centralization of power and decision-making and a great
expansion both of the role of the state and of the military and security
branches within it.68 This had obvious political and constitutional
implications for South Africa, and the increasing use of covert or clandes-
tine operations in the service of the total strategy also had implications
for the accountability of government and, hence, its tendency towards
corruption.
Any sort of covert operation has numerous ramifications. If a military
unit is secretly to channel arms to an ally, such as was actually done by the
SADF in Angola and Mozambique, it must first procure the necessary
weapons and ammunition. That means either manufacturing, capturing
or purchasing them. Since the supply of these weapons is to be secret, the
first option is not be recommended, as the weapons must not be traceable
to the actual supplier if they fall into the wrong hands. It was far better for
the SADF to capture Soviet-supplied weapons in Angola and then supply
them to RENAMO in Mozambique, or even to buy them from Warsaw
Pact countries on behalf of their clients, than to supply RENAMO and
UNITA with standard SADF equipment. Whatever the source of the
weapons, a covert armourer must establish a safe channel for their delivery,
probably requiring aircraft and pilots, possibly ships, or at least trucks and
drivers. Again, in the interests of secrecy, it is best not to use aircraft of
the regular air force or army vehicles for this purpose, since that would
make the operation too easy to trace back to the supplier government. Far
better to use a front company, an airline or transport company which, like
Chieftain Airlines or like the Frama company in Namibia,69 is apparently in
the private sector, but is in reality controlled by the secret services. Pilots
and truck-drivers are often men with families, and they require salaries,
67. Samantha Weinberg, Last of the Pirata: the search for Bob Denard Qonathan Cape,
London, 1994), pp. 108-9. For background, see W. Andrew Terrill, 'The Comoro Islands
in South African Regional Strategy", Africa Today, 33, 2-3 (1986), pp. 59-70.
68. Annette Seegers, 'Soudi Africa's National Security Management System, 1972-90',
Journal of Modem African Studies, 29, 2 (1991), pp. 253-73.
69. Ros Reeve and Stephen Ellis, 'An Insider's Account of the South African Security
Forces' Role in the Ivory Trade', Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 13, 2 (1995), esp.
pp. 231-3.
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insurance and pensions, which must also be arranged discreetly since the
operatives are not officially on the government payroll but on that of a front
company.
All of this means extra work for civil servants who must be employed for
the purpose. It also requires money, which, to preserve confidentiality,
can come from the secret budget of the state or from other sources. The
latter are preferable since private-sector funding is less easy for hostile
politicians, journalists and others to trace back to the government. The
latter, in fact, is precisely what happened in the Muldergate affair, in that
the funds used were relatively easy to trace and implicated politicians in
decisions which they later found it impossible to deny with any degree of
plausibility. Sometimes it is possible to 'launder' state funds destined for
a clandestine operation so as to make them appear as if they emanate from
the private business sector, or perhaps genuine businessmen can be
induced to finance projects which are primarily of strategic interest.
Again, these were all features of the financing of the Muldergate operation
in the 1970s.70 Some front companies may actually generate commercial
profits, which can be either diverted or ploughed back into the
operation. If money is to be generated from clandestine trade or illicit
business, it must be laundered or cleared through the banking system in
such a way as to disguise its origin and destination, and this may involve
breaking the banking laws, possibly of several countries. A pliable bank,
or even a bank secretly controlled by the secret services, is an asset.
Hence Chieftain Airlines was associated with a bank established in the
Ciskei homeland which took unlicensed deposits and engaged in currency
fraud.71 The bank's owner, a friend of Cabinet ministers Magnus Malan
and Pik Botha, was in business with one Vito Palazzolo, an Italian who had
worked as a money-launderer in the US and Europe for the important
'Pizza connection' mafia syndicate and had subsequently settled in
South Africa.72
The difficulties inherent in money-laundering, it is relevant to note,
are only one of several problems which secret servants intent on under-
taking covert or clandestine operations share with drug-traffickers and
other professional criminals. The creation of secret or covert networks,
maintained with secret funds, inevitably attracts the attention of pro-
fessional criminals and tempts otherwise honest people to steal, since
the funds involved are publicly unaccountable. So it was in South
Africa. Some companies set up by the secret services took illegal com-
missions or 'kickbacks' on otherwise legitimate contracts awarded by the
70. Rees and Day, Muldergau.
71. Harms Commission.
72. 'A Cute Little Bankhaus in Bisho', Nosetoeek, 9 (Sept, 1994), pp. 4-6. On Palazzolo,
Ralph Blumenthal, Last Days of the Sicilians (Times Books, New York, 1988), esp. p. 316.
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government. This was particularly common in the South African home-
lands or bantustans, where there was little effective legal supervision of
public works contracts and where corruption was rife.73 Other branches
of the South African government used intermediaries to import oil, since
South Africa's international isolation sometimes meant that a middleman
had to be employed to disguise a transaction. This cost money in the
form of the agent's commission and offered opportunities for official
. corruption.74
Front companies are commonly used by secret services operating in
pursuit of state interests, and familiarity with their functioning is clearly
part of the tradecraft of intelligence officers and specialists in low-intensity
conflict. Politicians are necessary to any such operation, since their
authority is needed to legitimize any covert operation, and in fact the
element of political authority in such circumstances is crucial since it is
political responsibility alone which constitutes the dividing line between a
state-sponsored covert or clandestine operation and a purely criminal
affair, carried out for private interest by professional criminals or by secret
servants who have crossed the line to become rogue elements, disowned by
politicians and liable to criminal prosecution. If a dishonest politician,
whose authority is needed to provide top cover for an operation, demands
a percentage of the financial transactions taking place within his or her
sphere of interest, their demands can hardly be resisted. This was clearly
the case in South Africa, as Dr Eschel Rhoodie, a senior official responsible
for covert funding in the 1970s, has testified.73
The recent history of South Africa shows clearly how the pursuit of state
interests by covert or clandestine means, and the provision of funds or the
implementation of plans which are not publicly accountable, encouraged
the growth of corruption in South Africa and elsewhere. The system
developed into a complex set of relationships in which secret services
directly or indirectly developed commercial interests, and made increasing
use of violence as well. In effect the secret services became associated
with a spectrum of commercial and military or political activity. At one
extreme were ventures such as the 1981 mercenary attack on Seychelles
which were entirely military in nature. At the other end of the spectrum
were legitimate commercial companies such as GMR. All of these had in
common the presence of the South African secret services and, in particu-
lar, Military Intelligence. From the relatively straightforward bribery of
the Department of Information there was a direct line of progression to the
complex of commercial relationships in airlines, companies and legitimate
73. On the use of SADF front companies for political purposes in the homelands, Peires,
'The Implosion of Transkei and Ciskei'.
74. Shipping Research Bureau, Embargo, pp. 77-84.
75. 'Eh- Rhoodie Talks about "South Africa's Biggest Secret" ', Noiezoetk, July 1993, p. 5.
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or illegitimate trade in ivory and, according to at least one authoritative
source, drugs.76
It was only after it had suffered severe embarrassment from the attempt
to take over the government of Seychelles in 1981 that the South African
secret services settled on subtler means. It was in this way, as the South
Africans looked for ways of securing influence with President Rene's
government, that they came to appreciate the advantages .offered by Mario
Ricci's position in the islands and his contacts elsewhere.
Political finance and corruption
Others too were interested by Ricci's position in Seychelles. In 1980, a
friend of Ricci's, the Roman banker Roberto Memmo, learned of Ricci's
rights to incorporate offshore companies in the islands and established an
offshore bank there, Roberto Memmo Investment Banking.77 Although it
was not publicly known at that time, Memmo was a member of the Italian
masonic lodge P-2, a secret organization of leading figures in Italian
business, the security and intelligence services and politics, which, when its
existence was revealed, caused a sensation in Italy. A parliamentary
commission of inquiry in Italy established that the lodge had been closely
connected with right-wing politics. In effect, during the 1970s P-2 and
the Italian secret services had conspired in a strategy aimed at preventing
the election of a communist government in Italy, including by inspiring acts
of right-wing terror such as the 1980 bombing of Bologna railway
station. Leading members of P-2 had also succeeded in infiltrating the
finances of the Vatican.78
The full extent of corruption in Italian public life was to be fully laid bare
only by the mani pulite ('Operation Clean Hands') investigations of the
1990s. At the heart of politics in Italy for several decades, it has now been
proven, was a system whereby the main political parties received kickbacks
in return for the awarding of public contracts from businesses and
particularly from Italian parastatal companies over which politicians were
able to exert influence. Secret networks like P-2 enabled obscure figures,
such as the Venerable Master of the P-2 lodge Licio Gelli, to influence or
even to blackmail politicians and government officials and also to negotiate
with other important elements in Italian life, including the mafia and the
Vatican.79 The illicit payments negotiated through such networks
between businessmen and politicians were illegally transferred to the bank
76. Reeve and Ellis, 'An Insider's Account of the South African Security Forces' Role in the
Ivory Trade', p. 232.
77. Gianfrancesco Turano, 'Quella Banca d'Altura', II Mondo, 30 March-8 April 1991;
d'Aubert, L'argau sale, p. 162.
78. Martin Short, Inside the Brotherhood (Grafton Books, London, 1990), pp. 160-2,
537-63.
79. Alexander Stille, Excellent Cadavers; the Mafia and the death of the First Italian Republic
(Jonathan Cape, London, 1995), esp. pp. 11-12.
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accounts of various operators of the system and of individual politicians,
usually through an elaborate series of transactions involving paper com-
panies established for the purpose, and often by using offshore facilities
in Switzerland, the Caribbean and elsewhere. The amounts of money
involved were huge. One of the parastatal companies most deeply
involved in this process was the Italian state oil company, the Ente
Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI), which was eventually found, as a result of the
mam pulite judicial investigations, to have channelled over a billion and a
half dollars to Italian political parties in illegal payments.80 As part of the
political spoils system, Italy's leading political parties had also divided
along geographical lines the political oversight of the large Italian develop-
ment budget, with the Italian Socialist Party taking Somalia, for example,
and another party, Mozambique. Each party thus took its cut of kick-
backs from contracts given to Italian companies, as did the relevant officials
and politicians in Africa itself.81 This system of political financing
produced regular scandals in Italy whenever elements of the country's
clandestine system of power-broking were made public. It was only in the
early 1990s that circumstances permitted Italian judges to move against
the political parties and influence-peddlers.
Among the most prominent scandals produced by this system was the
1982 collapse of the Banco Ambrosiano with unrecoverable loans of some
$1.3 billion, at that time one of the largest bank collapses in history, and the
mysterious death of the Bank's chairman, Roberto Calvi, found hanging
beneath London's Blackfriars Bridge. The bad loans had been made to
shell companies actually controlled by Calvi and by the Vatican bank, the
Institute of Religious Works. A considerable amount of the money,
perhaps $250 million, had been siphoned off by the Venerable Master
of the P-2 masonic lodge. The Institute of Religious Works lost some
$500 million of Vatican money through its transactions with Banco
Ambrosiano.82
A number of people closely associated with the Banco Ambrosiano, with
ENI, and with the illicit provision of public funds to Italian political parties
had dealings in Seychelles in the 1980s. Roberto Memmo, for example,
worked as a commercial agent for ENI.83 A significant figure in Italy's
political and financial underworld, Francesco Pazienza, arrived in
Seychelles, on the run from the Italian police, in 1983. Pazienza was
well-known in Italy, and his name had already been associated with several
80. Jan van der Putten, 'Italiaans Staatsoliebedrijf Kampioen Smeergeldbetaler,' De
VolskranL, 18 February 1993.
81. Jean-Francois Medard, 'Les relations Nord-Sud: l'Afrique, les democraries occidentales,
et la corruption', Revue imemaaonale des sciences societies (UNESCO, Paris, Sept, 1996),
forthcoming.
82. Charles Raw, The Money-Changers (Harvill, London, 1992), p. 4.
83. Commissione Parlamentare d'Inchiesta sulla Loggia Massonica P2, AMegan Alia
Relazione, serie II (Vol. II, Rome, 1984), pp. 586-92.
184 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
major scandals. Pazienza had been a protege of a chief of Italian military
intelligence, General Giuseppe Santovito, who fell into disgrace when his
membership of the P-2 masonic lodge became known, and Pazienza had
been employed as a personal assistant by Roberto Calvi at a time when the
Banco Ambrosiano chairman was desperately seeking financial support
from the secret networks of Italian finance to cover the huge hole in his
accounts. It was Pazienza who was in fact the originator of the Sovereign
Order of the Coptic Catholic Knights of Malta, the company which Ricci
was to represent as a diplomat in Seychelles, and it was from him that
Ricci acquired the company.
Pazienza's extraordinary range of contacts in the fields of business,
politics and intelligence extended to the US, where he had at one stage
worked with a number of Americans associated with Ronald Reagan's 1980
election campaign. While Pazienza was an inveterate liar and fabricator of
tall stories, it does appear that he had helped the Reagan campaign by
supplying intelligence material calculated to embarrass Reagan's opponent,
the incumbent President Jimmy Carter.84
When he arrived in Seychelles in 1983, Pazienza was wanted for
questioning by the Italian police in connection with various affairs includ-
ing the collapse of the Banco Ambrosiano.85 His ambitions were
dazzling. He met Ricci and members of the government and shared with
them his ideas for turning Seychelles into an entrepot and operations centre
for commodity transactions of various kinds, using the off-shore rights held
by Ricci. He claimed to have the support of leading financiers in the US
and elsewhere, and indeed many of those he named did not deny knowing
Pazienza. Among the schemes which Pazienza claims to have conceived
were plans to sell fishing-rights to Mexican interests and to use the islands
as a base for dealing in cut-price Mexican oil.86 In November 1984
Pazienza learned from a government minister that two Italian policemen
were on their way to Seychelles to arrest him and he hastily left the islands,
travelling on a genuine Seychellois diplomatic passport. He was later
arrested in the US and extradited to Italy.87
Following Memmo and Pazienza to Seychelles came another Italian
connected to both ENI and the Banco Ambrosiano, the financier Florio
Fiorini.88 Fiorini was the former finance director of ENI who had
resigned after he was revealed to have prepared without proper authoriz-
ation a scheme to use ENI funds in a bid to save the Banco Ambrosiano,
84. Jonathan Kwitny's stories on Pazienza in The Wall Street Journal, 8 August 1985, and
9 August 1985. See also Larry Gurwin, The Calvi Affair (Pan, London, 1983), p. 191.
85. Raw, The Money-Changen, pp. 322-6.
86. Kwitny, The WaR Street Journal. See also the interview with Pazienza in Oggi, 5 June
1985; Seychelles Freedom Herald, August 1985. Supplemented by author's telephone inter-
views with Pazienza.
87. Kwitny, The Wall Street Journal.
88. On Fiorini, see d'Aubert, L'argent tale, pp. 97-167.
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shortly before the Bank's collapse.89 During his career at ENI Fiorini had
become a leading figure in the jungle of Italian political finance and
had demonstrated a remarkable talent for financial manipulation. After
leaving ENI he had gone on to build up a business empire on his own
behalf. His main vehicle was a company called Societe anonyme suisse
d'exportations agricoles, known as SASEA.90 SASEA was an obscure
Swiss agricultural products' company, part-owned by the Vatican, which
had little to recommend it other than a listing on the Geneva stock-
exchange. Shortly after the collapse of the Banco Ambrosiano and his
own departure from ENI, Fiorini assembled a consortium of businessmen,
many of them previously associated with both ENI and the Banco
Ambrosiano,91 who acquired and recapitalized SASEA. The company's
chairman was no less than Nello Celio, a former president of
Switzerland. In effect, Fiorini and his colleagues transformed SASEA
into a merchant bank, buying, asset-stripping and selling companies and
financing acquisitions in Europe and North America, while continuing to
work closely with Italian politicians. Fiorini had especially close contacts
with leaders of the Italian Socialist Party, especially Prime Minister Bettino
Craxi and Foreign Minister Gianni De Michaelis,92 both of whom were
to be convicted of corruption in 1995. (Their conviction is currently
pending an appeal).
Fiorini visited Seychelles for the first time in 1983 or 1984 and met both
Mario Ricci and President Rene.93 Fiorini had the idea of acquiring an
oil-trading facility in Seychelles, and he and SASEA worked with President
Rene to nationalize the Shell oil company in the islands. In 1985 the
government nationalized Shell and replaced it with the Seychelles National
Oil Company (SNOC), which also took a share-holding in a number of
SNOC subsidiary companies. An Italian oil firm, a shareholder in SASEA
with close associations with ENI, obtained a contract to manage the
Seychelles' government's new oil interests.94 The government and Fiorini
explained the nationalization by saying that it would enable Seychelles to
sell fuel to aircraft and ships visiting the islands. Pazienza, by this time in
detention, alleged that it was in fact the realization of his idea of using the
islands to trade oil on the world market.95
It was probably this development of Italian-run oil interests in Seychelles
which prompted the South African Military Intelligence officer, Craig
89. Gurwin, The Cahi Affair, pp. 60-1, 131.
90. A good short description of SASEA is in two articles by Larry Gurwin & M. Bakker,
'Waarom Hangt er zo'n Vieze Lucht rond Sasea?', FEM: Financieel Economisch Magazine,
11-19 May 1990; and 'Italiaans Ovemame-Duo Botst met Beurzen', FEM, 20-28 May 1990.
91. D'Aubert, L'argent tale, p. 132.
92. D'Aubert, L'argent sale, pp. 123-51.
93. Florio Fiorini, Ricoraan . . . da Lontano (Videopool, Milano, 1993), pp. 119-23.
94. D'Aubert, L'argent sale, pp. 152-5.
95. Seychelles Freedom Herald, August 1985.
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Williamson, to suggest in 1986 that he was joining GMR because of what
he called its 'background in oil'.96 After Williamson's entry into GMR,
there were rumours that the government of Seychelles and its parastatal oil
companies were used as a cover for South Africa to import embargoed
oil. This has never been proven, and oil traders and shippers did not
report any extraordinary tanker movements to Seychelles. Nevertheless, a
senior Seychellois diplomat has confirmed that, within a couple of years of
Williamson's entry into GMR, Seychelles had come to occupy a place in
South African sanctions-busting networks, apparently using paper trans-
actions rather than physical transhipment of oil.97 It is noteworthy that
Fiorini's former employer, ENI, developed such a system in the 1970s for
selling Arab oil to Israel via front companies and paper transactions in the
Bahamas, Malta and elsewhere.98 SASEA may also have entertained
other ideas to make money from the boycotts imposed on South Africa. A
private airline which inaugurated a weekly service from Nairobi via Mane
to Singapore, Ligne aerienne seychelloise, included at least one shareholder
with close links to SASEA. It was planned to join this to a Botswana—
Seychelles link.99
Among SASEA's acquisitions was a dummy company registered in
Seychelles' offshore facility called the Seychelles International Bank, which
Fiorini often called SIBANK and which appears to have developed
from the earlier Roberto Memmo Investment Banking. The Seychelles
International Bank did not have a full banking licence and, indeed, hardly
had a physical existence. Fiorini transferred the bank's official head-
quarters to Switzerland, although such transactions as it carried out were
actually performed from a small, shabby office in Monte Carlo. SASEA
issued cheques on the bank in an effort to buy shares in an Italian insurance
company.100
Fiorini went from strength to strength for as long as he enjoyed the
patronage of leading Italian politicians. Through a series of companies,
Fiorini, together with a partner, Giancarlo Parretti, who had only a few
years earlier been convicted of fraudulent bankruptcy,101 eventually suc-
ceeded in a major business coup, acquiring the Hollywood film company
MGM-United Artists for the sum of SI 3 billion, after they had earlier been
frustrated in an attempt to purchase the French film company Pathe.
These acquisitions were made with massive loans from the Netherlands
96. The Observer, 26 April 1987.
97. Author's confidential interview, November 1988.
98. Larry Gurwin, personal communication.
99. 'Flying in the Face of Sanctions', Africa Analysis, October 1987. List of LAS
shareholders in the author's possession.
100. D'Aubert, L'argent sale, pp. 151, 154.
101. On Parretti, Edward Jay Epstein, 'The Mystery of the Instant Mogul', Spy, June 1990,
pp. 85-93.
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subsidiary of the French state-owned bank Credit lyonnais.102 A French
parliamentary commission of inquiry in 1994 failed to reveal any sound
commercial reasons for the size of Credit lyonnais' lending to such dubious
financiers as Fiorini and Parretti.103 The commission's rapporteur, a
deputy from a party opposed to the French Socialist Party which then held
the French presidency, gradually put together a picture of political
influence-peddling Unking SASEA, Fiorini and Parretti with Socialist
politicians in Paris, where Parretti had been the accredited representative
of the Italian Socialist Party, Rome and even Spain.104 Using Credit
lyonnais Bank Nederland loans, the two Italians acquired a cinema chain in
Britain and the Netherlands on behalf of the Italian media tycoon (and
later prime minister) Silvio Berlusconi.105 They consistently managed to
engineer major acquisitions not only with loans from Credit lyonnais Bank
Nederland, but also from their own Seychelles International Bank. For
the MGM acquisition they also appear to have been supported by letters of
credit issued by the Sovereign Order of the Coptic Catholic Knights of
Malta.106 Seychelles International Bank was at the heart of Fiorini's and
Parretti's finances. Where it acquired its funds from remains unclear.
SASEA was eventually to go bankrupt with debts of 2-7 billion Swiss
francs, about 81 billion.107 Tracing exactly what happened to this money
will probably be no easier than it was in the case of the Banco
Ambrosiano. Credit lyonnais was left with ownership of MGM-United
Artists, probably worth considerably less than what Fiorini and Parretti had
paid for it, and with a loss of 6-9 billion French francs on its 1993 accounts,
much of it stemming from the bad loans incurred by Credit lyonnais Bank
Nederland.108 It appears that Fiorini and Parretti, having learned their
trade in Italian political finance and enjoying excellent relations widi
leading members of the Italian Socialist Party, had gone some consider-
able way to extending the Italian system of political financing to other
countries, notably France, although this is a matter which requires further
investigation.
The US connection
Some influential figures in the US, too, had formed an opinion of the
ease with which die Seychelles' government could be swayed and of
the influence enjoyed in die islands for some years by Mario Ricci.
102. Assemblee Nationale, Rapport de la commission d'enquete sur le Credit lyonnais (2 vols.,
Rapport no. 1480, Paris, 1994), I, pp. 71-86.
103. Assemblee Nationale, Rapport de la commission d'enquete sur le Cridit lyonnais.
104. D'Aubert, L'argent side.
105. Assemblee Nationale, Rapport de la commission d'enquete sur le Cridit lyonnais, I, p. 82.
106. D'Aubert, L'argent sale, pp. 416-8.
107. The Geopolitical Drug Dispatch, No 48 (October 1995), p. 8.
108. Assemblee Nationale, Rapport de la Commission d'enquete sur le Cridit lyonnais, I, 23,
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US security and foreign policy in the early 1980s was a bone of
contention not only between competing bureaucracies—at the White
House, the State Department, the CIA and the National Security
Council—but also a myriad of unofficial interests loosely attached to the
political entourage of President Ronald Reagan and his Director of Central
Intelligence, William Casey. This was the tangle which was to produce
the Iran-contra affair, which came to public attention in 1986.
As CIA director from 1981 to 1987, William Casey actively supported a
network of unofficial contacts which, in his view, would assist in the
ultimate aim of securing US security interests in the world. He enjoyed
the unusual status for a Director of Central Intelligence of having cabinet
rank and, in the opinion of some, he was to become the most important
figure in the Reagan administration second only to the President
himself.109 Casey was an old intelligence hand who had served in the
Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the forerunner of the CIA, in the
Second World War. A visceral anti-communist, he took up the post of
CIA chief determined to restore America's capacity to fight its foes around
die world which, in his opinion and that of many in the Republican Party
and in the CIA itself, had been undermined by misguided efforts, particu-
larly under President Jimmy Carter, a Democrat, to impose restrictions
on the Agency. This, thought Casey, had had a disastrous effect on
die CIA's effectiveness and morale. Casey and other Cold Warriors in the
Reagan administration encouraged an array of informal contacts to build a
private-sector network which could deliver help to America's friends and
allies around the world without having recourse to what they considered
the emasculated CIA or the fickle, Democrat-dominated, US Congress.
The revelation of illicit deals with Iran and the Nicaraguan contras was
eventually to expose the existence of other secret wars fought by Casey and
the CIA extending to parts of die world odier than Iran and Nicaragua, and
arms-dealing links with South Africa.'l0 Casey's basic purpose was to get
money and guns to any of America's allies who needed them in order that
they might inflict damage on America's enemies, and principally the Soviet
Union and its allies. The South African government clearly came into the
Cold War category of friends of America. It was a bastion of anti-
Communism in Africa and it was the main conduit to the UNITA
organization in Angola.
Just as South African anti-communists saw the strategic possibilities
offered by Seychelles, so did some in America. Some of Casey's associ-
ates, notably in the influential World Anti-Communist League, became
109. Joseph Persico, Casey: from the OSS to the CIA (Viking, New York, 1990), p. 575.
110. Contra Links Go Unnoticed,' Southscan, 15 October 1987; Bob Woodward, Veil: The
secret wars of the CIA, 1981-1987 (Pocket Books, New York, 1987), p. 300; Steven Emerson,
Secret Warriors: inside the covert mUixary operations of the Reagan era (C. P. Putnam's Sons,
New York, 1987), p. 222.
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interested in the islands, encouraging propaganda against its Socialist-
government, depicted in a series of articles in the US and British press in
the early and mid-1980s as a Soviet client, and fraternizing with the exiled
opposition. In the wake of the 1983 US invasion of Grenada, it was not
unrealistic to imagine the US government, or at least William Casey's
fellow-travellers on the extreme right, backing a coup in strategically
important, and allegedly Marxist-dominated, Seychelles. The US
Department of Defense was concerned about the Seychelles' government's
pro-Soviet tendencies and had its own connections to Defence Minister
Ogilvy Berlouis, who was received at the Pentagon in 1985.1U It
appeared that some in the US security establishment saw Berlouis as a
potential future president of the islands, recognizing in him an ambitious
man with no ideological baggage despite his tenure of a senior post in the
Rene government. The coup plan aborted in August 1986 (described
above) had the active support of the South African intelligence services and
claimed support from prominent US anti-communists and from the British
secret services.
Perhaps the greatest controversy surrounding the Iran-contra and associ-
ated networks was the precise role played by the two senior members of the
US executive, President Ronald Reagan and Vice President George
Bush. The latter was a former Director of Central Intelligence and, unlike
Reagan, an expert in foreign policy. Both during the Reagan admin-
istration and during his own presidency, Bush had to fight to deny having
had any role in the Iran-contra affair or in other affairs related to the US
government's covert or semi-privatized diplomacy and secret wars.
In view of this, it is noteworthy that one of Bush's closest aides became
associated with Mario Ricci in Seychelles. In February 1985, a partner in
the US law firm used by Mario Ricci, former US Deputy Trade Secretary
David R. Macdonald, travelled to Seychelles to discuss with Ricci and
President Rene how the Seychelles government could best be represented
in Washington. He then discussed the matter with Vice President Bush's
press secretary, Peter Teeley. Teeley resigned his position at the White
House on 1 March 1985 to open a public relations practice in the private
sector. Within a week of his resignation Teeley had agreed to represent
the government of Seychelles in Washington jointly with Macdonald,
and the two of them undertook to introduce Seychellois ministers in
Washington at whatever level they desired.112 The bill for these services,
86,000 per month, was not paid by the Seychelles government but by
Mario Ricci personally and correspondence concerning this lobbying
111. Author's confidential interview, Chicago, November 1988. See also correspondence
between Peter Teeley and David Macdonald and Mario Ricci obtained from US Justice
Department under the Foreign Agents' Registration Act.
112. David R. Macdonald to President Rene, 8 March 1985, obtained from US Justice
Department.
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arrangement was addressed not to the Seychelles' government but to Ricci
personally.113 In the circumstances, it is unlikely that Teeley would have
resigned a senior position in the White House to take on this consultancy
without informing his employer, Vice President Bush. It is testimony not
only to the importance for the US government of developments in
Seychelles at that time but also to the influence which Mario Ricci was
acknowledged to have. It seems likely that senior US officials wished to
cement their country's influence in Seychelles but also to outflank the more
extreme anti-communists such as those of the World Anti-Communist
League.114 Neither the South African government nor mainstream US
agencies actually sought to overthrow President Rene by the mid-1980s,
and certainly not after the failed coup of August 1986, since they already
had him under control. They were probably most afraid, by this time, not
that Seychelles was becoming a Soviet client but that it would be destabil-
ized by extreme anti-communists working with William Casey. This
threat from the extreme right was to disappear after exposure of the
Iran-contra networks in America and after South Africa had aborted the
1986 coup. The ending of the Iran-Iraq war was later further to reduce
the sensitivity of the western Indian Ocean.
American and South African interests in Seychelles were quite similar.
The various arms of the US security establishment were generally agreed
on the need to support the Pretoria government in the context of the Cold
War, although it was not politically acceptable for Washington to state its
support for the apartheid government in Pretoria unequivocally. There
were also more complex aspects to this relationship. The US and South
Africa were both on the same side in the Angolan war, and needed
to cooperate in the supply of UNITA. In the Middle East, the US
was determined to prevent an Iranian victory in the Iran-Iraq War and was
supplying massive quantities of arms to Iraq but was also arming Iran in
secret in order to secure the release of US hostages in Lebanon. Since the
South African weapons industry was selling weapons to Iraq and being
part-paid in Iraqi oil,115 the Americans had an interest in monitoring the
flow of weapons from Pretoria to Baghdad so as to ensure the desired
strategic balance between the two Middle Eastern rivals. At the same
time Washington did not wish to disrupt Pretoria's oil supplies from Saudi
Arabia and other Gulf states which supported Iraq in the Gulf War. As
Indian Ocean islands, Seychelles and the Comoros stood in the middle of
113. Correspondence between Peter Teeley and David Macdonald and Mario Ricci
obtained from US Justice Department. Supplemented by author's confidential interview,
Chicago, November 1988.
114. On the WACL, Scott Anderson and Jon Lee Anderson, Inside the League (Dodd, Mead
& Co., New York, 1986).
115. Kenneth Timmerman, The Death Lobby: how the West armed Iraq (Bantam, London,
1992), pp. 227-30.
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the sea-lanes and air-routes carrying weapons from South Africa to the
Gulf and oil in the opposite direction.
Some effects in Seychelles
As bureaucrats and businessmen hammered out these strategic arrange-
ments in offices in Washington, Geneva, Pretoria and elsewhere, and in
business meetings in hotels all over the world, and as vast amounts of
money changed hands, an atmosphere of intrigue and skulduggery settled
on Seychelles and among some Seychellois exiles. There were occasional
political assassinations or 'disappearances' in the islands, which although
few in number, had an unsettling effect in such a small community.116
Gerard Hoarau, the most effective of the Seychellois exiles, published a
series of detailed, well-documented and highly embarrassing allegations
concerning corruption by the Seychelles government and promised further
revelations117 which were never forthcoming: in November 1985, Hoarau
was machine-gunned in a quiet London suburb. His killer, apparently a
professional assassin, was never identified.
There were constant rumours that the islands were being used for
heroin- and currency-trafficking. In late 1984, in the US, the New Jersey
police found the mutilated bodies of two local drug-traffickers, apparent
victims of a gangland killing. One of the two had in his pocket an address
book which contained the name and address of Florio Fiorini and the name
and private phone number of President France Albert Rene. The circum-
stances in which he had come to write these numbers in his address book
were a mystery. The US ambassador to Seychelles at the time recalls that
when he gave this information to the President, Rene went pale with
apprehension. It was the only time that the ambassador recalls seeing
Rene truly startled.118 Important international crime syndicates seem to
have infiltrated much of the region: in London Francesco Di Carlo, a
Sicilian convicted in 1987 of heroin-trafficking on behalf of a mafia crime
family in a major trial, was shown to have regularly visited Mombasa,
Kenya, where some casinos were said to be used by the Italian mafia for
both money-making and money-laundering on a significant scale.119
Between the inception of Seychelles' private offshore tax haven in 1978
and 1992 some 40 companies registered to make use of the facility.120
According to Finance Minister James Michel, speaking in 1995, some of
116. Amnesty International, Seychelles: Political Imprisonment and Allegations Regarding the
'Disappearance' or Extrajudicial Execution of Suspected Opponents of the Government (AFR
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them 'have been engaged in illegal activities and were being investigated by
Interpol and the US State Department'.121 In a court case in France in
1986, for example, it emerged that a company registered in the Seychelles'
offshore facility had been used to transact major arms deals, possibly in an
effort to acquire nuclear material for Libya.122
Finance Minister James Michel's acknowledgement in 1995 of the
abuses of the Seychelles' tax haven and measures taken by him to reform
the way in which the system worked do not signal an end to the islands'
involvement in money-laundering. In November 1995, the Seychelles
national assembly amended the constitution in order to open the way for
legislation guaranteeing immunity from criminal prosecution for any
foreign businessman investing a minimum of $10 million in the islands.
The Economic Development Bill provides immunity from prosecution for
all investors meeting these requirements 'for all criminal proceedings
whatsoever except criminal proceedings in respect of offences involving
acts of violence and drug trafficking in Seychelles'.123 The director of
Britain's Serious Fraud Office commented that it was 'the perfect present
for drug barons, fraudsters and money launderers'.124
The Cold War and global corruption
The fact that South African secret servants, Italian businessmen and
others were able to exert such pressure on the government of Seychelles,
and indeed the influence which these people had in their countries of
origin, should be considered in the context of the Cold War. It was the
perception of a total onslaught against the government in Pretoria which
led South Africa's politicians and secret services to adopt increasingly
ruthless measures throughout the region and, as we have seen, these
entailed a rapid escalation of corruption in South Africa itself. The same
was broadly true of Italy, for the growth of corruption in Italian public life
was directly connected to the fear in certain high circles of the Italian
Communist Party coming to power in Rome. Organizations like P-2 were
pledged to assure that this would not happen, and they were able to
commit all manner of crimes, including massive corruption, in the name of
anti-communism. For four decades Italian businessmen and voters and
Italian politics itself were hostages to this system.125 It is no coincidence
that the end of the Cold War was to encourage an extraordinary wave of
political reform not only throughout Africa, including both Seychelles and
South Africa, but also in Italy, where magistrates were at last able to indict
politicians and others suspected of corruption.
121. Indian Ocean Newsletter, 14 January 1995.
122. Indian Ocean Newsletter, 7 March 1992; d'Aubert, L'argent sale, pp. 148-51.
123. Indian Ocean Newsletter, 18 November 1995.
124. Quoted in 'Revealed: Paradise for Crooks', Sunday Times (London), 14 January 1996.
125. Stille, Excellent Cadavers, pp. 9-10.
AFRICA AND INTERNATIONAL CORRUPTION 193
Corruption on this scale, once entrenched, is hard to eliminate. A good
example of this is provided by the maze of companies and organizations set
up or acquired by the South African intelligence and security officers in
their fight to defend apartheid. Front companies established by intelli-
gence operatives are difficult to trace and difficult to close, not least since
their existence may be quite legal and their formal ownership may be
no longer vested in the state, but in nominees who cannot legally be
dispossessed by administrative decree. Such companies are capable of
transforming themselves, if necessary by acquiring a new name but continu-
ing in the same business, as a snake sheds its skin. In this way the
arrangements made in or concerning Seychelles in the 1970s and 1980s
have produced a longer-lasting infrastructure of personal connections
and institutions designed to evade national laws and to perform illicit
transactions. There is evidence that illicit trade arrangements set up in
southern Africa originally for military reasons survive in the form of net-
works engaged in the ivory, currency, diamond, drug and weapons
trades.126 These trades have now become a major threat to the security of
South Africa and they are an important feature of the political economy of
various regions of Africa. This legacy is complicated by the fact that secret
service and special forces operatives who have acquired expertise in covert
operations have shown themselves capable of using their skills to mount
totally independent ventures in the private sector. There are many exam-
ples of this, but an important one for the present discussion is the South
African security company Executive Outcomes Ltd., which has worked in
Angola, Sierra Leone and elsewhere and which has generated a wide array
of front-companies in fields from air transport to video production.'27 In a
similar vein, successive companies manipulated or controlled by Italian
political financiers have shown a similar tendency to resurface in new forms.
In general, the Cold War encouraged the development of relations
between crime, politics and intelligence activity, largely because secret
services and politicians who purported to be acting for the greater good of
the West were prepared to tolerate or even to promote politicians of
dubious morality and to do deals even with professional criminals, particu-
larly in the Third World but also in the industrialized world. The
longevity of the Italian mafia and the growth of the world narcotics trade
are both in part consequences of bargains made by Western politicians and
secret services with foreign governments or even with criminal elements in
their own countries and sustained over considerable periods of time.128
The growth of transnational crime and of the corruption associated with it,
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often seen nowadays as an emerging security threat to the nations of the
West, grows out of the Cold War itself.
If a government or an individual politician in an African country is
offered unaccountable funds by foreign governments, and is made to
understand that refusal can entail violent attempts to overthrow the govern-
ment, it becomes more understandable why some politicians may come to
see international politics as a jungle, in which richer governments ruthlessly
pursue their perceived national or factional interest at the expense of
smaller and poorer ones. Not all African governments are subject to the
same pressures as those applied to Seychelles, but there are certainly many
blandishments and threats which are never publicly reported and are not
assimilated in academic analyses of corruption and governance. In the
case of Seychelles, and no doubt in many other cases also, many of the
pressures or promises offered from abroad were articulated by various
secret services. While there is an enormous literature and an array of
specialist journals on secret services, academic studies of intelligence and
security services have devoted little attention to Africa in general, with the
partial exception of South Africa.129 The evidence of the present study
suggests that intelligence services play an important role not only in the
politics of some African states but also in relations between rich countries
and Africa and that, not surprisingly, they are often charged with the more
delicate or less acceptable tasks of diplomacy. If the case of Seychelles is
anything to go by, intelligence services in developed countries are largely
concerned with carrying out aspects of foreign policy which are to be
concealed from the domestic public rather than any other function.
If this observation is correct, the inferences which follow apply at least as
much to the wealthier nations of the world as to African governments.
And if analysis of the activities of major intelligence agencies in Africa tells
us something about' the nature of governance in some of the world's older
and wealthier democracies, it also tells us something about the nature of the
political enterprise in those same democracies. Much of the unorthodox
or illicit financial activity in Seychelles directly or indirectly was connected
with the funding of political parties or individual politicians. This was so
not only in the case of funds used for Seychelles' own ruling party, but also
in regard to Italy. SASEA's extraordinary relationship with Credit
lyonnais suggests the existence of a particular relationship with Italian politi-
cal parties and perhaps also with the French Socialist Party. Political parties
in modern advanced democracies, it seems, are permanently in search of
funds in excess of what they can obtain from domestic party members
129. Roy Pateman, 'Intelligence Agencies in Africa—a Preliminary Assessment', Journal of
Modem African Studies, 30, 4 (1992), pp. 569-85. On South Africa, Robert d'A. Henderson,
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of sympathizers. The competition for political power is such that they may
be prepared to seek such funds from unorthodox or illicit arrangements
with business, or with their own secret services, or a combination of the
two. Money can be laundered in real-estate transactions and leveraged
buy-outs of the type undertaken by SASEA, in which political support is
crucial. It can also be laundered in some circumstances through the media
industry, and here the attempts of Florio Fiorini and Giancarlo Parretti to
buy film companies and newspapers meshed with the interests of politicians
in acquiring influence with the media. Media magnates-cum-politicians
such as Silvio Berlusconi are products of this tendency.
Inasmuch as Africa is a field where the governments of powerful
countries can pursue factional or personal interests virtually unchecked,
Africa may be a more significant factor in the politics of some Western
countries than is generally imagined, due to the relative ease with which
unaccountable funds can be obtained or laundered there.130 The global-
ization of capital movements makes it all the easier and more tempting to
carry out such transactions abroad, and here small and easily manipulable
states like Seychelles are an obvious attraction. Political job-men and
money-launderers come into contact with professional drug-smugglers,
and streams of business, political and criminal finance may merge.
Africa's role in the international narcotics trade, we may note, is increasing
rapidly, not as a producer but as an intermediary for products consumed in
North America and Europe.131
In this way problems of political funding, crime and governance more
generally in the rich world become inseparable from related problems in
Africa itself. The networks thus established may become independent of
their political instigators, creating power blocs with enduring interests
which survive changes of regime in, for example, Rome, Paris or Pretoria.
The impression gained by the French Member of Parliament Francois
d'Aubert, chairman of the Anti-Mafia Commission of the French National
Assembly and rapporteur of the Commission of Inquiry into Credit
lyonnais, is worth citing as a description of the nebulous political-financial
networks in modern democracies:132
I observed a shadow area, a zone of contact between legality and illegality,
between the licit and the criminal, between clean money and dirty money,
between honest people and out-and-out crooks. It is a no-man's-land domi-
nated by a demi-monde of intermediaries of every kind, of corrupters and
corrupted enjoying complete impunity for laundering money in investments
which are clean, safe and profitable.
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In South Africa, the growth of political corruption was associated with a
very special factor, namely the protracted struggle to defend apartheid.
South Africa and southern Africa may feel the effects of methods used in
the service of the total strategy for years to come as Pretoria's former secret
servants continue their careers either inside or outside the public service.
Trans-border trafficking of drugs and weapons is frequently seen by
commentators, and by the South African government itself, as a major
security threat in an age, and in a part of the world, where conventional
wars between states seem to have become obsolete and to have been
replaced by armed conflict carried out by factional interests, often associ-
ated with international trades in illicit products, including narcotics.
Funds gained from enterprises of this type can be channelled into political
finances, and in South Africa, as in Italy and elsewhere, the dividing lines
between secret services, organized crime and political parties may be seen
to have become blurred to a considerable degree.
In much of tropical Africa, the decline of state power in recent years has
resulted in the emergence of networks of long-distance trade in high-value
commodities including gems, weapons and drugs which are both sources of
wealth and vectors of political-military conflict, such as in Liberia, Angola,
Somalia and elsewhere.133 This is an important development in which
anti-corruption or good governance campaigns are of little relevance, since
either these trades are outside the control of collapsed states, or the political
powers which are emerging depend on them for their own finances. Such
long-distance trades are producing new patterns of politics in Africa in
which secret services or privatized security organizations like Executive
Outcomes are playing an important role. There are examples of major
banks which launder drug-money and facilitate more traditional forms of
corruption such as bribery and capital flight for governments and for
individual clients but which are also tolerated by major Western intelli-
gence agencies which find it convenient to observe, but not to denounce,
the illicit flows of financing for states, drug barons, political parties
and terrorist organizations. BCCI, the Bank of Credit and Commerce
International, whose collapse marked the biggest bank failure in history, is
the best-known example.134 The .detailed reconstruction in die present
article may serve as a contribution to a deeper understanding of the origins
and nature of these contemporary phenomena which are inextricably
associated witfi general questions of governance and politics.
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